VIETNAM PROGRAMME
July 11, 2000
The Director,
Environmental Protection Department
27th Floor, Southorn Centre
130 Hennessy Road
Wanchai
Hong Kong
Fax: 2147 0894
Dr Peter Wong
Chairman, Advisory Council of the Environment
10/F Citibank Tower
Citibank Plaza
3, Garden Road
Hong Kong
Fax: 852 21363347
Dear Sir
Technical
Review Comments on the EIA for the Sheung Shui to Lok Ma Chau Spur Line
The attached document comprises a technical review
undertaken of the EIA for the Sheung Shui to Lok Ma Chau Spur Line.
The review was prepared at the invitation of the Hong
Kong Birdwatching Society (HKBWS) as a contribution to the public consultation
process for the EIA. HKBWS are part
of the BirdLife International global partnership. BirdLife International is a
global conservation federation with a worldwide network of Partner
organizations, representatives and committed individuals.
The review focuses on key components of the EIA document, notably those
components of particular significance for the ecology and biodiversity of the
wetlands of Long Valley. In
preparing this review, I have drawn on over 10 years of experience of EIA in
Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, working for the International Institute
for Environment and Development, Wetlands International, as well as my current
work for BirdLife International.
During this period, I have undertaken EIAs, as well as
prepared reviews and technical advice to a wide range of organisations as part
of their EIA review processes. These organisations include government agencies,
development assistance agencies and non-governmental organisations.
I would like to point-out that the EIA system in Hong
Kong is extremely impressive, and is serving an extremely important role,
particularly in terms of providing a vital opportunity for public discussion
and debate about development projects with potential impacts on Hong Kong’s
increasingly pressured environment. In the case of the Long Valley wetlands,
these environmental values are of importance at both the local, national and
global level, a point which is made in the main body of the EIA report. It is
vital that these values are respected in environmental planning in the SAR.
Based on this technical review, I consider that this EIA document contains a
number of fundamental flaws which serve to impair the value of the EIA document
as a decision-making tool. Therefore, I regret to recommend that the EIA should
be rejected. The strengths and weaknesses of the EIA document are highlighted
in the attached technical review. Whilst a careful technical examination of the
EIA drew attention to multivarious technical weaknesses, I have tried to group
my comments broadly, and around 4 themes critical to EIA review and
decision-making. Firstly, the extent to which the EIA fails to argue and
articulate clearly the justification for the project, as required under Item
2.1 (i) of the EIA Study Brief.
Secondly, and linked to the first, the failure to assess the full range
of potential alternatives to this project design, as required under Item 3.9.3
(ix) of the EIA Study Brief. Thirdly, in my view, the Executive Summary and
Conclusions of this document – the only components of this EIA which are likely
to be read by many decision-makers, does not provide a fair reflection of the
findings of the EIA study, as articulated in the main text of the report. This
would represent a breach of the technical memorandum of the EIA Ordinance. It is my opinion that this weakness
risks misleading decision-makers on a number of key points, in favour of a
decision for the approval of the central alignment. Finally, the proposed mitigation options presented by this EIA
lack technical credibility. This is a pivotal issue to the approval of this
document.
I would like to thank the Advisory Council on the
Environment (ACE) in advance for the consideration of this technical review,
and look forward to hearing of the outcome of your deliberations.
Yours sincerely
Ross Hughes
BirdLife International
Vietnam Programme Office
Hanoi, Vietnam
cc. The
Secretary Hong
Kong Bird Watching Society
The Environmental Subcommittee Wetlands
International
Advisory Committee on the Environment Ramsar
International
Ramsar
China Office
BirdLife
International Vietnam Programme
No. 11, Lane 167,
Tay Son St., Dong Da, Hanoi.
Tel/Fax: 844 8517217; E-mail: birdlife@birdlife.netnam.vn
Technical Review of the EIA for the Sheung Shui to Lok Ma
Chau Spur Line
1. Overall
summary
1.
The EIA prepared
for this development has succeeded in collating a great deal of useful
information on the potential environmental impacts of the development. The main
body of the report succeeds in summarising the data included in further depth
in the Appendix. In short, the technical standard of data collection is
extremely impressive.
2.
The data
compiled and analysed within the appendices and main body of the report draws
attention to the biodiversity value of the Long Valley, including the presence
of species of ‘global, national and local significance’ (see Tables
4.2-4.4). The EIA
also draws attention to the inherent values of the wetlands of Long Valley,
including their significance as the largest remaining area of undeveloped
floodplain (see section 2.2.6) remaining in Hong Kong SAR.
3.
Consideration
of the findings of this EIA needs to be placed within the context of the
findings of Final Strategic Environmental Assessment report of the Second
Railway Study, submitted to the Advisory Council on Environment (ACE). This
study suggested that Long Valley be considered an ‘absolute constraint’
for railway development. Section 7.4.24 of this report states:
‘Overall, a recent ecological study for the NENT Development Study has
concluded that the Long Valley area is one of the most important fresh wetlands
in the SAR… and that the preservation of this area is important for protecting
the biodiversity of Hong Kong’
4.
Chapter 4
(Ecology Impact Assessment), recognises that the project will create
unavoidable and significant ecological impacts. For example, section 4.7.7
states that
‘…avoidance and minimisation measures are unable to fully mitigate
for habitat loss and disturbance impacts…’ . Chapter 4 also refers to the
direct, irreversible and permanent impacts on a number of species
5.
On the basis
of this review of the EIA documentation, the EIA appears to be seriously
flawed. On a number of points, the EIA fails to comply with the EIA Study Brief
issued under Section 5 (7) of the Environmental Impact Assessment Ordinance
(CAP 499), and/or with requirements set-out in the Technical Memorandum of the
EIA Ordinance. For the reasons
outlined below, it is recommended that the EIA is rejected. Flaws in the EIA fall within 4
categories. These are:
a). the EIA fails to sufficiently justify the purpose of the project, since it
omits to include and consider figures for projected growth in demand for the Lo
Wu Boundary crossing. It is conceivable that more environmentally-benign
measures could be employed that would relieve over-crowding pressure at Lo Wu
until the completion of the Lok Ma Chau crossing and transport links via West
Rail (II).
b). To comply with Item 10 of the Technical Memorandum of the EIA Ordinance,
the Executive Summary must clearly reflect the contents of the EIA report. Unfortunately, neither the Executive
Summary nor the Summary and Conclusions (Chapter 13) of the EIA succeed in
meeting this requirement. This is a fundamental issue, since the Executive Summary
is the only component of the EIA likely to be read by many decision-makers. In
its present form, the Executive Summary manifestly fails to reflect the
biodiversity importance of this area, the status of the area as the largest
remaining floodplain area in Hong Kong, nor the potential risks and impacts to
biodiversity identified in the main text and appendices of the report. For
example, Table 4.2 lists a number of species of conservation significance in
the area, including threatened species at the local, national and global level.
The executive summary fails to give mention to these key findings.
Of more concern is that the executive summary and conclusions clearly state
that there will be ‘no insurmountable environmental impacts associated with
this project’. This statement cannot be reconciled with data included in
Table 4:30 which refers to the ‘Direct’, ‘permanent’ and ‘irreversible’
implications of the project on habitat loss, and the ‘considerable
ecological change’ such impacts will incur. Section 4.7.7 states that ‘avoidance
and minimisation measures are unable to fully mitigate for habitat loss and
disturbance impacts’ .
An assessment of the risks and uncertainties associated with likely efficacy of
the mitigation measures is not included in the Executive Summary. An awareness
of these risks and uncertainties is crucial to understanding the potential
implications of this project. This is also a requirement of the EIA Study Brief
(Item 2xi). In simple terminology,
this should answer the questions “What is the probability that the proposed
measures will successfully mitigate impacts” and “what are the
implications of proposed measures failing to fully mitigate impacts”.
Careful consideration of this statement also reveals an important and
potentially-significant ambiguity – whether these impacts will be ‘surmounted’
by project mitigation measures, or whether this such impacts could be
surmounted in theory (irrespective of proposed mitigation measures).
Clearly, the evidence presented in the Ecological Impact Assessment would
suggest this refers to a theoretical scenario. The inclusion of this
critical statement is therefore highly misleading.
c). In contravention of Item 3.9.3 (ix) which stipulates that the EIA must “recommend
all possible alternatives [emphasis added]”, the EIA fails to assess
adequately the full range of alternative project options potentially available
to address the problem of overcrowding at the Lo Wu Boundary crossing.
Alternative project options might offer the opportunity to avoid serious
environmental impacts and reduce investment costs. These might include
upgrading of passenger handling facilities at Lo Wu, and/or extending opening
times at the border crossing to attenuate passenger use during periods of peak
demand.
Further, the project fails to give adequate
attention to the ‘No Project’ option, in breach of the EIA Ordinance. Of the four route alignments considered
by the EIA, data and information provided in Chapter 4 would suggest that the
central alignment would be the most ecologically-damaging option. The central
alignment would result in ‘direct’, ‘irreversible’ and ‘permanent’ habitat loss
according to Chapter 4 of the EIA, and would also fragment the wetlands into
northern and southern components. Adoption of the River Beas route, which would
run to the north of the wetland and use an existing transport corridor, or the
southern routes, would avoid such impacts. Therefore, it is perplexing to see
the description of mitigation measures assert, based on little evidence that:
‘ The Spur Line alignment has been selected
based on engineering, operational safety and environmental grounds
[emphasis added].’
d). Mitigation proposals outlined in the EIA report are inadequate and
unconvincing, and fail to advise the reader on the risks and uncertainties
associated with implementation of these mitigation measures, a requirement
of Item 2 (xii) of the EIA Study
Brief (see also Annex 20, ‘Guidelines for the Review of An EIA Report’). Experience of wetland creation
elsewhere, particularly in the USA (which also operates a ‘No Net Loss’ policy
for wetlands), indicates a high failure rate for wetland creation, even with
careful planning, adequate resources and high levels of technical inputs. In
most cases, artifically-created wetlands take many years before supporting
similar wildlife communities to those they are designed to replace. The EIA is
unconvincing in terms of provisions for planning, technical support or
resourcing. Most importantly, there will be insufficient time between the
physical creation of wetland
conditions (for example, for the temporary mitigation wetland) and the
establishment of wetland ecological communities. Institutional arrangements for post-completion wetland
management appear ad hoc and poorly considered. Further, the risks of wetland (re-)
creation measures are not considered nor given due prominence. The credibility
of the assertion that mitigation measures will be successful is of pivotal
importance to the approval of this EIA.
e). ‘Like-for-like’ compensation for wetland loss is required to comply with
Town Planning Regulations, which require developers to ensure that there is ‘No
Net Loss’ of wetlands arising from a development project. Information provided within the EIA
would indicate that net loss of wetlands would occur, associated with
the construction of the station complex at Lok Ma Chau. This would be in breach
of Town Planning Regulations. This point is obfuscated in the EIA
documentation. A breach of the ‘No Net Loss’ regulations would establish a
serious precedent for wetland conservation in the SAR, especially in view of
Hong Kong’s obligations as a signatory to the Ramsar Convention.
On the basis of this EIA review, it is strongly
recommended that careful consideration is given to considering project options
that could alleviate over-crowding whilst also avoiding impacts to the Long
Valley wetland area, complying with obligations under the Ramsar Convention[1],
and meeting project objectives more quickly and cheaply. For the reasons
outlined above, the EIA should not be approved …. [more to follow once I
have checked the EIA regulations web site!]
Specific Comments
What is the
Justification for this Project?
Section 2.1 (I) of
the EIA Study Brief requires the proponents to state the reason for the
project. Section 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 of the EIA states the purpose of the project
is to address potential crowding and congestion at the Lo Wu Boundary Crossing.
Surprisingly, the EIA statement does not include projections for future
passenger demand, but instead provides three figures of past passenger volume,
including one figure for peak demand recorded during Easter 1999. The omission
to include projected passenger volumes would appear fundamental, since the
justification for the project rests on a presumed increase in future demand.
Whether
overcrowding will continue as a problem after opening of the Lok Ma Chau
boundary crossing is unclear, since the proponents have not presented projected
passenger volume figures in the EIA.
The ‘one-off’ figures supplied in the EIA are not placed within the
context of existing and future capacity, either for trains or passenger
handling facilities at the boundary crossing. Therefore, it is not possible to
assess the relevance of these figures to future planning. This omission also
places an inherent constraint on the assessment of alternative project options
– an important role of the EIA process (see below).
Does the Executive
Summary and Conclusions Reflect the Findings of the EIA Study?
The Executive
Summary and Chapter 13 (Summary and conclusions) are the only sections most
readers and ‘decision-makers’ will read, since the EIA documentation as a whole
runs to several hundred pages.
These sections conclude that ‘no insurmountable environmental impacts
will result from implementation of the Spur Line project.’ It clearly
underplays the ecological importance of the area. Chapters 4 (Ecological Impact Assessment) and 13
(Conclusions and Recommendations) acknowledge the importance of the area for ‘globally,
nationally and locally threatened species’, internationally recognised
terms which give a clear indication of the ecological significance of the area.
Surprisingly, these terms are dropped from the executive summary. This leaves
the reader with little clear impression of the gravity of ecological risks or
potential impacts.
Does the EIA
Assess All Possible Alternatives?
A key role of
EIA is to evaluate all possible project alternatives. Article 3.9 (ix) of the
EIA Study Brief requires the EIA to:
“recommend all possible alternatives (such as modifications of layout
and design) and practical mitigation measures to avoid, minimize and/or
compensate for the adverse ecological impacts identified.”
The reason
for the project, stated in Section 1.1.2 of the EIA, is to alleviate
over-crowding at the Lo Wu border crossing. Therefore, to comply with Article
3.9 of the study brief, the EIA must consider all feasible means for
alleviating overcrowding at Lo Wu.
The EIA statement considers alternatives only partially, in terms of
routing options for the rail alignment.
To this end, the EIA provides an assessment of 4 possible routing options, 3 of which are rejected because
of ‘insurmountable engineering constraints’[2].
Surprisingly, other approaches to addressing the over-crowding problems at
Lo Wu have not been considered.
An obvious
potential alternative might be to upgrade passenger handling facilities at Lo
Wu border crossing. This might be viable because much congestion and
overcrowding problems would appear to be associated with passenger volume
‘backing-up’ onto the station facilities at Lo Wu as passengers disembark from
trains and move through over-stretched handling facilities, heading for the
mainland. An alternative (or additional) approach might be to extend opening
times at the border crossing, particularly during periods of peak demand. This
strategy might enable KCRC to manage congestion at Lo Wu to acceptable levels
until the opening of the new border crossing and Lok Ma Chau (see below).
The opening
of the new border crossing at Lok Ma Chau, comprises a second alternative, and
this may substantially reduce overcrowding at Lo Wu. Planning and construction of this alternative is now
underway, and rail links will be installed as part of the ongoing West Rail
development. This alternative
should be assessed, since the opening of West Rail (Phase II) might reduce
demand for services along the Spur Line, and hence impact on the econmic
viability of the proposed development.
The
introduction of differential pricing systems (to attenuate passenger flow
during peak periods) or more frequent services during peak times might also
have been given consideration as part of the EIA.
Each of these
alternatives offer the potential for entirely avoiding environmental impacts on
the Long Valley wetlands, whilst also offering the potential for considerable
cost saving, through avoiding the need for expensive rail infrastructure
development.
The failure
of the consultants to address alternatives sufficiently undermines the
credibility of the EIA process. The approach adopted by the consultants
prematurely narrowed the focus and attention of decision-makers to route
alignment options only. Impacts associated with these options might be avoided
in totality by a more strategic approach to transport planning and impact
management.
The stated
reasons for the selection of this alignment vary in the EIA text. Chapter 4 (section 4.7.2) states that
the ‘The Spur Line alignment has been selected based on engineering,
operational safety and environmental grounds.’ [emphasis added],
although there seems to be little evidence to support to the selection of this
alignment on environmental grounds. The central alignment is likely to have by
far the highest impact on the wetlands on Long Valley, whereas the Beas River
option would utilise an existing tranport corridor and avoid undully
fragmenting the wetland.
Are
the Proposed Mitigation Measures Credible?
Mitigation
measures are proposed for each group of construction and implementation
activities. The assertion that mitigation measures will be successful is of
pivotal importance to the approval of this EIA and the future of the Long
Valley wetlands.
The report acknowledges that mitigation measures will be necessary to reduce
impacts. Since it will not be possible to mitigate some impacts (such as
habitat loss), the EIA includes proposals to compensate for wetland loss. For a
number of reasons, proposals for impact mitigation and compensation are unconvincing:
a). the EIA
fails to advise the reader on the risks and uncertainties associated with
implementation of these mitigation measures (see for example, Annex 20,
‘Guidelines for the Review of An EIA Report’). Experience of wetland creation
elsewhere, particularly in the USA (which also operates a ‘No Net Loss’ policy
for wetlands), indicates a high failure rate for wetland creation, even with
careful planning, adequate resources and high levels of technical inputs. In
most cases, artificially-created wetlands take many years before supporting
similar wildlife communities to those they are designed to replace. This degree
of uncertainty should be addressed in the EIA, and reference should be made to
this in the excutive summary.
b). proposed arrangements for planning, technical support and resourcing of
post-completion mitigation and compensation measures are vague and uncosted.
For example, few details are provided as to how fishpond management will be
‘enhanced’. Indeed, some species, such as the critically-endangered Black faced
Spoonbill appear to favour exisiting fishpond management. There is therefore a
danger that poorly-conceived ‘enhancement’ may actually reduce their
biodiversity value.
Institutional arrangements refer to an ad hoc wetland management
organisation, that has yet to be established. The role, institutional
arrangements, staffing and financing structure of this new organisation are not
described. In short, what will this organisation do, how will it achieve its
objectives, and what guarantees can be given that this organisation will be
effective?
c).
Sufficient time is required after the physical creation of wetland conditions
(for example, for the temporary mitigation wetland) to allow the establishment
of wetland ecological communities. Management inputs will also be required
during this period. It should also be remembered that this transition period
will be required twice – firstly to allow for the temporary wetland to
establish itself, and secondly for the re-created wetland under the new
viaduct. The latter will have lower ecological value because of noise
disturbance (data to support this can be found in Chapter 4) and visual value.
Successful wetland creation for mitigation purposes would therefore take
several years. Unfortunately, section 2.5.1 states that:
“… the project is being progressed on a “fast track” basis
because of the safety concerns related to overcrowding at Lo Wu station. The programme therefore dictates that
all the detailed design works should be completed by the end of year 2000. The construction works will commence in
early 2001 for completion in early 2004”.
Thus, it
would appear highly unlikely that there will be sufficient time available for
wetlands to become sufficiently established to fulfil a mitigatory function.
d). Information
provided within the EIA would indicate that net loss of wetlands would occur,
associated with the construction of the station complex at Lok Ma Chau. The Lok
Ma Chau station falls within the Wetalnd Conservation Area (buffer zone) of the
Ramsar site which will represent a net loss of about 10 hectares of wetland
(mainly fishponds). This would be in breach of Town Planning Regulations, since
the proposed compensation measures will only seek to enhance the management of
existing wetlands (fish ponds). This will neither compensate in terms of area
nor function (since degraded meanders and fish ponds do not provide equivalent
wetland functions as inundated floodplain wetlands, including equivalent
biodiversity and human uses). A breach of the ‘No Net Loss’ regulations would
establish a serious precedent for wetland conservation in the SAR, especially
in view of Hong Kong’s obligations as a signatory to the Ramsar Convention.
e). Article 2
(xii) of the EIA Study Brief requires the proponent to identify constraints
associated with the mitigation measures recommended in the EIA study. The
issues outlined in a) to d) above are not addressed, and therefore the EIA
study fails to comply with the study brief on this issue.
e). Section
13.12 (about the efficacy of proposed mitigation measures) states:
“These compensation measures will
eliminate all residual impacts resulting from habitat loss and disturbance from
this Project, for all Species of Conservation Importance in the Long Valley
area.”
For the
reasons outlined in a) to d) above, an objective assessment of the data
collected as part of the EIA process would fail to support this assertion.